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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
PETER LYSENKO,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

vs.

)

MITCHELL J. SAWAYA and
LILLIE MARIE SAWAYA,

)
)

Defendants-Appellees.

Case No. 980011-CA

Oral Argument
Priority 15

)

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1997).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court correctly grant Peter Lysenko

("Lysenko") damages for conversion based on the salvage value
testified to by Lysenko!s expert rather than in-place value of
the equipment?
2.

Did the trial court correctly grant Lysenko damages

for conversion based upon salvage value rather than awarding
Lysenko possession of the converted equipment when the prayer
of Lysenko's Complaint did not seek possession of the equipment,
when at trial Lysenko

sought

damages or possession

in the

alternative and when some of the equipment had been repaired or
thrown away?

The trial court's determination of the appropriate damages
for conversion will not be set aside unless its determination
is clearly erroneous. Henderson v. For-Shore Co., 757 P. 2d 465,
468 (Utah App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature

of

the

Case,

Course

of

Proceedings

and

Disposition Below.
This action was originally commenced by Curtis Loosli as
Plaintiff on October 19, 1994.

[R. 4]

The Complaint alleged

that Defendants-Appellees Mitchell J. Sawaya and Lillie Marie
Sawaya (the "Sawayas") had converted certain equipment owned by
Plaintiff located at a Burger King Restaurant in Orem, Utah,
previously leased and operated by Lysenko.
Burger King's landlords.
Lysenko.

The Sawayas were

Burger King, in turn, subleased to

The Complaint also contained a count for declaratory

relief that Plaintiff owned the equipment, and for injunctive
relief.

The prayer of the Complaint sought the replacement cost

of

equipment

the

or,

alternatively,

the

fair

market

value

thereof; a declaration that Plaintiff owned the equipment; and
an injunction prohibiting the Sawayas from selling or conveying
any interest in the equipment.
Shortly
Plaintiff.

before

trial,

Lysenko

was

substituted

as

The case was tried to the court on October 3 and 4,

2

1996.

[R. 2-79]

At trial, Lysenko asked for the value of the

equipment or possession thereof.

[R. 257]

At the close of trial the court took the matter under
advisement

and

on

October

18,

1996,

entered

a

Memorandum

Decision finding that the Sawayas had converted the equipment
and awarding judgment against the Sawayas for the salvage value
of the equipment in the amount of $12,980.00, plus interest and
costs.

[R. 291-83]

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

were entered by the court

[R. 335-23] on March 21, 1997 and a

judgment was entered on that same day.
Thereafter,

Lysenko

filed

[R. 33 8-3 6]

a Motion

for

Amendment

to

Findings and Judgment, or for New Trial, which was denied by the
court by Memorandum Decision entered July 30, 1997.

[R. 361-57]

A final Order denying the motion was filed on August 20, 1997.
[R. 363-62]
B.

Statement of Facts.

1.

On May 22, 1978, the Sawayas as lessors entered into

a Ground Lease Agreement with Burger King Corporation as lessee
for property located at 1075 South State Street, Orem, Utah (the
"Premises").

The lease provided for a 15-year term and Burger

King was given the option to extend the term for five additional
periods of five years each.
2.

[Finding of Fact No. 1]

Under the Sawaya-Burger King lease, any additions or

improvements would remain the property of the Sawayas if not
removed within 15 days after termination of the lease.
of Fact No. 3]
3

[Finding

3.

Burger King constructed a restaurant building on the

Premises and then entered into a Lease/Sublease Agreement with
Lysenko on February 6, 1979.
4.

[Findings of Fact No. 4]

The Lysenko-Burger King agreement stated that Burger

King's ownership of the improvements was subject to its ground
lease with the Sawayas.

The sublease further stated that any

personalty installed by Lysenko would remain his property after
termination of the lease.
5.

On January

Financing
Restaurant

Statement
including

[Findings of Fact Nos. 5 and 8]

12, 1993, Central Bank

which

was

secured

equipment,

by

fixtures,

filed a UCC-1

the

Burger

King

furniture, signs,

improvements, accessories, extensions and additions related to
the restaurant.
6.

[Finding of Fact No. 12]

Burger King terminated Lysenko's franchise agreement

for default on February 2, 1993.

The termination prohibited

Lysenko from using the Burger King System and the Burger King
Marks.

[Finding of Fact No. 10]
7.

On November 30, 1993, the Sawayas1 counsel informed

Central Bank, Lysenko and Burger King that all improvements,
personal property and equipment were to be removed with 15 days
after February 6, 1994, pursuant to the ground lease between the
Sawayas and Burger King, or the property would be forfeited to
the Sawayas.
8.

[Finding of Fact No. 11]

In a letter dated January 26, 1994, the Sawayas"

counsel indicated that he understood the Lysenko's claim to the
restaurant property was subject to the claims of Burger King and
4

Central Bank and that, therefore, the Sawayas were not in a
position to allow Lysenko to enter the Premises and remove any
property.
9.

[Finding of Fact No. 13]
On February 7, 1994, Lysenko informed the Sawayas he

would commence moving the property on February 11, 1994.

At

that time, Lysenko requested that someone be present to unlock
the building as the locks had been changed.

[Finding of Fact

No. 14]
10.

Loosli, who was a former employee of Lysenko, had

agreed to purchase Central Bank's security interest
equipment,

which

consideration

for

purchase
this

was

funded

purchase

was

by

work

Lysenko.
that

previously done as an employee of Lysenko's.

in the

Loosli

The
had

[Finding of Fact

No. 15]
11.

On February 8, 1994, Central Bank sold to Loosli its

rights in the equipment.
12.
to

[Finding of Fact No. 16]

On May 28, 1996, Loosli conveyed all the equipment

Lysenko

subject

to

the

Loosli-Central

Bank

agreement.

[Finding of Fact No. 17]
13.
remove

Lysenko was never able to enter the Premises and

the

terminated.
14.

equipment

after

his

lease

with

Burger

King

[Finding of Fact No. 18]
Lysenko's expert, L. Reid Steenblik, testified that

two measures exist

for determining

the value of

restaurant

equipment. Those measures are in place value which measures the
value of equipment as a going concern; and salvage value, which
5

measures

the

value

restaurant and sold.
15.

of

equipment

be

removed

from

the

[Findings of Fact No. 19]

According to Steenblik, the in-place value of the

equipment was $35,185.00.
was

to

$10,980.00.

had

been

disposed of following termination of the Sawaya-Burger

King

lease.

In

The salvage value of the equipment

addition,

certain

equipment

That equipment only had a nominal value of $2,000.00.

Thus, the total salvage value was $12,980.00.

[Findings of Fact

Nos. 20 and 21]
16.

David Williams was a member of HB Properties, LLC.

which leased the Premises from the Sawayas after termination of
the Lysenko lease at an initial lease rate of $2,500.00 per
month.

[R. 378, pp. 220-222; Plaintiff's Ex. 16]
17.

When Mr. Williams inspected the equipment in the

restaurant he saw equipment that had not been operating since
the '70s.
18.

[R. 378, p. 221]
Much of the equipment at the restaurant was old and

dilapidated.

Extensive repairs were done to the equipment and

other equipment was thrown out.
19.

The prayer of

Lysenko's Complaint

possession of the equipment.
for conversion.
20.

[R. 378, pp. 222-232]
did not

seek

Instead, Lysenko sought damages

[R. 4-1]

When Lysenko filed his memorandum in support of his

Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment or for New Trial,
he asserted that the court "should amend its trial order to
award Peter Lysenko the full value in place of the improvements
6

and equipment retained by Sawayas.

Alternatively, the Court

should grant a new trial."1 [R. 322-319]
21.

Lysenko's Docketing Statement on this appeal stated

the issue was whether the trial court had erred by awarding
salvage value of the equipment rather than in-place value.

No

issue was raised concerning the trial court's failure to award
possession of the equipment to Lysenko.

[See Appendix A]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court correctly awarded Lysenko the salvage

value of the equipment.
testified
equipment.

that

there

Lysenko's own expert, Reid Steenblik,
were

two

values

for

used

restaurant

One value is the in-place value of equipment used as

part of a going concern.

The other value is salvage value for

equipment that would be removed from the premises and sold.
Damages for conversion are intended to compensate the Plaintiff
for the actual loss suffered as a result of the conversion.

The

court acted well within its discretion in determining that the
actual loss to Lysenko was represented by the salvage value of
the equipment because he could not use the equipment on the
Premises.
Lysenko attempted to raise an unjust enrichment claim for
the first time months after trial.

Lysenko was not entitled to

In Lysenko's motion, he asked that the court amend its
judgment to award the full amount of $35,449.00 or, alternatively,
grant Lysenko the right to remove his equipment or, alternatively,
for a new trial. [R. 317] However, the supporting memorandum made
no mention whatsoever of a request to remove the equipment.
7

raise this new theory at that time.

There was no evidence of

unjust enrichment presented at trial, nor was the issue of
whether the Sawayas were unjustly enriched and, if so, the
amount of such enrichment litigated at trial.
2.

The trial court did not commit error in not awarding

Lysenko possession of the equipment.
sought damages.

Lysenko always primarily

In fact, the prayer of his Complaint sought

damages only; it did not contain a request for possession of the
equipment.

At trial, Lysenko sought damages based upon his own

expert's testimony or, in the alternative, possession of the
equipment. When Lysenko filed his motion to amend the findings,
etc. months after trial, the memoranda he filed with the court
only claimed that the court should have awarded the in-place
value of the equipment rather than salvage value. The memoranda
contained not one word about any argument that the court should
have awarded Lysenko possession of the equipment.

And, when

Lysenko filed his Docketing Statement with this court, he only
claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to award the inplace value of the equipment.

Lysenko did not claim that the

trial court's failure to award possession of the equipment to
him constituted error or was an issue on this appeal.
The
awarding

trial
damages

court

acted

rather

well within

than

possession

its discretion
of

the

in

property,

especially given the fact that Lysenko always sought damages.
The evidence demonstrated that much of the equipment was old and
dilapidated.

Equipment had to be extensively repaired before it
8

could be used.

Other equipment was thrown away.

There would

have been damage to the premises in removing the equipment.
And, Lysenko had no restaurant in which he could have used the
equipment.

Although

Lysenko

testified

that

he

could

use

particular items of equipment if he opened up a new restaurant
and that he was "looking to reopen a restaurant", the trial
court was no. bound to believe that testimony or to award
Lysenko possession based upon some vague intent to perhaps open
a restaurant some time in the future.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE SALVAGE VALUE

OF THE EQUIPMENT.
The deposition of Lysenko's expert, Reid Steenblik, was
read into evidence at trial.

Mr. Steenblik testiiied as to his

opinion of the salvage value of the equipment and the in-place
value of the equipment.

The court essentially adopted Mr.

Steenblik's salvage value figures and ruled that:
In order to compensate the Plaintiff for actual
losses, his damages should be limited to the value he
would receive by removing the equipment from the Burger
King Restaurant.
Therefore, this Court finds that the
Plaintiff is entitled to the salvage value of that
equipment which remains in the restaurant and is currently
used, that being $10,980, as well as a nominal value for
the equipment disposed of in the amount of $2,0 00.00. [R.
285]
The trial court determined that salvage value was the
appropriate measure of value in order to compensate Lysenko for
his actual losses.
in part

on

the

In this regard, the court based its decision
fact

that

although
9

some

of

the

equipment

continued to be used at the premises, other pieces of equipment
had been disposed of and replaced by newer equipment.
para. 2]

[R. 3 61,

The testimony at trial was that much of the equipment

was old and dilapidated and that extensive repairs had to be
done

to

replaced.
The

certain

equipment

and

other

equipment

had

to

be

[See Statement of Facts Nos. 18 & 19 above]
trial

court

properly

recognized

that

the

rules

relating to the measure of damages for conversion are flexible
and that the court had discretion to award damages so as to
compensate Lysenko for actual losses.

In Jenkins v. Equipment

Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Utah App. 1994) , cited by the
trial court in its decision, this court set forth the following
principles concerning damages in a conversion case:
The Utah Supreme Court and this court have stated
that generally, the measure of damages in a conversion
action is the value of the property at the time of the
conversion, plus interest. "'The damages in an action for
conversion are measured by the sum of money necessary to
compensate the plaintiff for all actual losses or injuries
sustained as a natural and proximate result of the
defendant's wrong.'" "Generally, damages for interference
with the plaintiff's right to use the property are
measured by the rental value of the item involved or by
the reasonable cost of hiring a replacement item." . . .
"However, rules relating to the measure of damages
are flexible, and 'can be modified in the interest of
fairness1. The primary objective in rendering an award
of damages for conversion is to award the injured party
full compensation for actual losses." [869 P.2d at 1004]
[Emphasis added]
These same principles were recognized by the Utah Supreme Court
in Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 454

10

(Utah

1978) and by this court in Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d
465, 468-69 (Utah App. 1988).
When Lysenko filed his Complaint, he sought damages for
conversion measured by "the replacement cost of the personal
property, or, alternatively, for the fair market value,"
[R. 1]

When Lysenko filed his Motion for Amendment of Findings

and Judgment

or

for New Trial

several months

after trial,

Lysenko argued for the first time that the Sawayas had been
unjustly enriched and that the proper measure of damages was not
the loss to Lysenko, but instead was the benefit to the Sawayas
under an unjust enrichment theory.

Lysenko argued that the

Sawayas were benefitted by the fact that the equipment remained
on the premises because of their lease with HB Properties.
However, the Complaint contained no claim for unjust enrichment
and there was no evidence of unjust enrichment presented at
trial.

There was no absolutely no evidence that the rental

amount the Sawayas received on the lease to HB Properties in the
initial sum of $2,500.00 a month was a nickel more than they
would have received without the old equipment being present or
that $2,500.00 per month was more than a fair rent for the
building, or that any other circumstances existed which made the
receipt of the rent unjust.
Lysenko argues that the court's award of damages based
upon salvage value was contrary to the proper measure of damages
for conversion "as established" in Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet,
876 P. 2d 421, 425

(Utah App. 1994) .
11

This same argument was

raised by Lysenko for the first time on his motion for amendment
of the findings, etc. when Lysenko raised his unjust enrichment
claim for the first time. The trial court properly rejected the
argument.

Bailev-Allen was not even a conversion case and is

not at all on point.
In Bailev-Allen, a construction contractor filed suit on
various theories, including unjust enrichment, to recover the
value of services provided with respect to construction of a
home prior

to the time

that

the construction

terminated by the owner for breach.

contract

was

The trial court held that

the contractor was entitled to recover for unjust enrichment
even though the contractor had breached the contract by not
providing evidence of insurance and by its lack of supervision
of the project.

This court agreed that unjust enrichment was

an available theory, but reversed and remanded on the basis that
there

were

insufficient

findings

to

support

the

unjust

enrichment award.
Lysenko also tells the court in this regard that the trial
court expressly found that the value to the Sawayas of the
equipment was $35,185.00.

That is not correct.

All the trial

court found was that the equipment had an in-place value of
$35,185.00.

The Sawayas never used the equipment.

And, as set

forth above, there was no evidence that the Sawayas got paid one
nickel more for the lease of the building with the old equipment
than they would have received without the equipment.

Lysenko

tries to substitute speculation for evidence by arguing that the
12

"income stream (of the lease with HB Properties) is obviously
based on the in-place value of the equipment."
Brief, p. 14]

[Appellant's

There was no such evidence presented at trial.

Because the unjust enrichment claim was not raised by Lysenko
until months after trial, neither party had an opportunity to,
nor did, present evidence with respect to whether the Sawayas
were unjustly enriched or, if so, the amount of such enrichment.2
The trial court properly awarded Lysenko his actual loss
represented by the salvage value of the equipment.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN NOT AWARDING

LYSENKO POSSESSION OF THE EQUIPMENT.
Lysenko tells the court that he sought possession of the
equipment in his Complaint and clearly expressed at trial that
he wanted to recover possession of the equipment.
Brief, p. 11]

This is an overstatement.

2

[Appellant's

In fact, possession of

Lysenko also argues that HB Properties saved approximately
$60,000 in equipping the Premises because the old equipment was
left in place. That is incorrect. Mr. Williams testified that he
did not have an exact figure for what he spent equipping the
kitchen but it was "in the ball park" of $75,000.
[R. 378, pp.
228-229] Mr. Williams further testified that a couple of years
earlier he had spent $135,000 to $140,000 to equip the Burger King
Restaurant in Idaho Falls.
[R. 378, pp. 233-234] There was no
testimony that the equipment that needed to be purchased in the two
restaurants was identical.
Further, there was no evidence
whatsoever on the cost of the extensive repairs to the existing
equipment which would have to be taken into account in determining
total costs of equipping the Premises. Finally, even if it is
assumed that HB Properties would have had to spend $60,000 more for
all new equipment, had it done so it would have had new equipment
that would not have to be replaced as soon as old equipment and
would not be subject to the same level of repairs and maintenance
as old equipment.
13

the equipment was always an afterthought with Lysenko.

What

Lysenko pushed in the court below was an award of damages.
The Complaint contained claims for damages for conversion,
a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff owned the equipment and
was entitled

to possession of the equipment

and

injunctive

relief prohibiting Defendants from selling or conveying
interest in the equipment.

any

In the prayer of his Complaint,

however, Plaintiff sought damages, but not possession of the
equipment.

[R. 4-1]

The only claim that Lysenko proceeded with at trial was
his claim for damages for conversion.

In his closing argument,

Lysenko's counsel asked the court to award him either the value
of the equipment as damages or possession of the equipment.
378, p. 257]

[R.

And, when Lysenko made his Motion for Amendment of

Findings and Judgment or for New Trial, he argued only that the
court should award him the in-place value of the
instead of salvage value.
initial

memorandum

or

his

possession of the equipment.

equipment

Lysenko said not one word in his
reply

memorandum

about

[R. 322-319; 354-352]3

wanting
Finally,

3

In Plaintiff's Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment
or for New Trial, Plaintiff stated:
"Plaintiff hereby moves this Court for an order
amending the judgment in this matter to the amount of
$35,449.00. Alternatively, Plaintiff moves for an order
granting Plaintiff the right to remove his equipment.
Alternatively, Plaintiff moves for a new trial." [R. 317]
However, Plaintiff never argued for possession of the equipment in
his memoranda.
14

when Lysenko filed his Docketing Statement on this appeal, he
only raised the issue of whether he should have been awarded inplace value of the equipment.

Lysenko did not claim the trial

court's failure to award possession of the equipment to him was
an issue on this appeal.4

Clearly, the possession claim is an

after-thought.
Under the circumstances of this case, especially where
Plaintiff was arguing primarily for damages, the trial court
acted well within its discretion in awarding damages rather than
possession of the equipment.

The evidence was that much of the

equipment was old and in disrepair.

David Williams testified

that he had not seen much of that type of equipment since the
1970s.

Further, extensive repairs were required to be done to

equipment before it could be used. And, it was obvious from the
nature of some of the equipment that the Premises would have
been damaged by removing it.
In this regard, Lysenko argues that he was planning on
opening

a new restaurant

and

could

have used

equipment from the Premises in his new restaurant.
Brief, p. 9]

most

of

the

[Appellant's

Again, this is an overstatement of the record.

Lysenko's only testimony in this regard was as follows:
Q.
A.

Do you have use for these particular items yourself?
I'm looking to reopen a restaurant.

4

Although the fact Lysenko did not list
as an issue in the Docketing Statement does
from raising the issue on appeal (Nelson v.
P.2d 568 (Utah 1996), it does show the issue
15

the failure to award
not prevent Lysenko
Salt Lake city, 919
is an afterthought.

Q.

Would you like these items returned to you?

A.

I could use most of them.

[R. 377, p. 102]
Lysenko did not testify to any specific plans for opening any
specific restaurant, nor did he testify he actually wanted the
items returned to him, nor did he testify as to which specific
items he could use if he actually opened another restaurant.
What Lysenko in fact wanted and requested from the court was
damages represented by the value of the equipment.

Lysenko just

does not like the value figure which the court adopted based
upon the testimony of Lysenko1 s own expert. And, of course, the
court was not bound to believe Lysenko1s testimony about some
vague

contemplation

of

the

possibility

of

opening

another

restaurant some day.
As the authorities cited above demonstrate, the purpose
of damages in a conversion case is to compensate the plaintiff
for the value of what was lost.

That is exactly what the damage

award in this case did by awarding Lysenko salvage value, which
is the value the equipment had if it were removed from the
Premises.

Lysenko's claim that the court erred by not awarding

possession of the equipment to him should be rejected, both
because Lysenko always sought damages and because the evidence
fully supports the court's decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
16

5+DATED this ZA

day of May, 1998
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
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Attorneys for
Defendants-Appellees
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Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PETER LYSENKO,
DOCKETING STATEMENT
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Subject to Assignment
to the Court of Appeals

vs.
MITCHELL J. SAWAYA and LILLIE
MARIE SAWAYA,

Case No. 970505

Defendants-Appellees.
Peter Lysenko subject this docketing statement pursuant to Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
1.

Judgment Sought to be Reviewed. The trial court entered its judgment on

March 21, 1997. Lysenko served Plaintiffs Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment
or for New Trial on March 18, 1997. No other motions under Rules 50(a) or (b), 52(b), 54(b),
or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were filed.
The trial court entered its Order denying the post-judgment motion on August 20, 1997.
On plaintiffs motion, the court entered an Order on September 19, 1997, grailting a 30-day

extension of time to appeal. Lysenko filed his Notice of Appeal on October 20, 1997. October
19, the technical deadline for filing the notice of appeal, was a Sunday. The Notice of Appeal
was filed on Monday, October 20, 1997, and was therefore timely.
2.

Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996).
3.

Claim for Damages. The complaint made a prayer for unspecified damages.

The judgment was for $17,621.28. Plaintiffs new trial motion sought to increase the judgment
to $35,449.00.
4.

Nature of Proceeding. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth

Judicial District Court of Utah County in a civil case.
5.

Material Facts. Lysenko operated a Burger King restaurant on property owned

by Sawayas. Burger King had initially leased the property from Sawayas and had constructed
the restaurant building and then leased the building and property to Lysenko.

Lysenko

subsequently purchased the building from Burger King, but did not purchase the underlying
property. Lysenko also purchased equipment to operate the restaurant. The lease between
Sawayas and Burger King contained a provision purporting to vest title to the improvements and
equipment on the property in Sawayas if the property was not removed within 15 days following
termination of the lease.
Burger King terminated its franchise with Lysenko and required that he vacate the
premises. Lysenko sought to remove the equipment and other improvements, but Burger King
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denied permission. The Sawayas' lease later terminated, and Lysenko made timely demand for
access to the building in order to remove his equipment. Sawayas denied access. Lysenko
brought this action seeking either the return of the equipment and other improvements or their
reasonable value.
Lysenko presented evidence at trial concerning the fair market value of the equipment
converted by Sawayas. The evidence showed that the equipment had a liquidation value of
$12,980.00, but that its value in place was $35,449.00. Notwithstanding evidence that Sawayas
were benefitting from the full, in-place value of the equipment, the trial court awarded damages
at only the liquidation value.
6.

Issue on Appeal and Standard of Review.
Did the trial court err in selecting liquidation value, rather than in-place value,

as the measure of damages for equipment and other property converted by a landlord, where the
landlord was unjustly enriched by the full in-place value of the equipment? The determination
of the appropriate standard for measuring damages is a conclusion of law which is reviewed for
correctness. United Truck Rental Equipment Leasing. Inc. v. Kleenco Corp.T 929 P.2d 99, 106
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1996); Beck v. State Department of Transportation and Public Facilities. 837
P.2d 105, 116 (Alaska 1992).
7.

Statutes. Rules and Cases Believed to be Determinative of Issues. Bailey-Allen

Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) establishes the measure of damages as
the benefit conferred on the defendant, rather than the plaintiffs detriment.
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8.

Attachments.
a.

Memorandum Decision, dated October 18, 1996.

b.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered March 21, 1997.

c.

Judgment, entered March 21, 1997.

d.

Plaintiffs Motion for Amendment of Findings and Judgment or for

New Trial, mailed March 18, 1997.
e.

Memorandum Decision, dated July 30, 1997.

f.

Order, entered August 20, 1997.

g.

Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, dated September

h.

Order Granting Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal,

19, 1997.

dated September 19, 1997.
L

Notice of Appeal, filed October 20, 1997.

DATED this //** day of November, 1997.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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